On the Rapid Computation of Various Polylogarithmic Constants by Borwein, Peter et al.
On the Rapid Computation of
Various Polylogarithmic Constants
David H. Bailey, l Peter Borwein, 2 Simon PlouffJ
NAS Technical Report NAS-96-016 April 1996
dbailey@nas.nasa.gov, pborwein@cecm.sfu.ca, and plouffe@cecm.sfu.ca
NASA Ames Research Center
Mail Stop 258-6
Moffett Field, CA 94035-1000
Abstract
We give algorithms for the computation of the d-th digit of certain transcendental
numbers in various bases. These algorithms can be easily implemented (multiple
precision arithmetic is not needed), require virtually no memory, and feature run
times that scale nearly linearly with the order of the digit desired. They make it fea-
sible to compute, for example, the billionth binary digit of log(2) or _ on a modest
workstation in a few hours run time.
We demonstrate this technique by computing the ten billionth hexadecimal digit of
it, the billionth hexadecimal digits of _'_, log(2) and log2(2), and the ten billionth
decimal digit of log(9/10).
These calculations rest on the observation that very special types of identities exist
for certain numbers like n, it 2, log(2) and 1og2(2). These are essentially polyloga-
rithmic ladders in an integer base. A number of these identities that we derive in this
work appear to be new, for example the critical identity for 7z:
_01_( 4 2 1 1 )= 8i+1 8i+4 8i+5 8i+6 .
i=
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1. Introduction.
It is widely believed that computing just the d-th digit of a number like 7r is really
no easier than computing all of the first d digits. From a bit complexity point of
view this may well be true, although it. is probably very hard to prove. What we will
show is that it is possible to compute just the d-th digit of many transcendentals in
(essentially) linear time and logarithmic space. So while this is not of fundamentally
lower complexity than the best known algorithms (for say _r or log(2)), this makes
such calculations feasible on modest workstations without needing to implement
arbitrary precision arithmetic.
We illustrate this by computing the ten billionth hexadecimal digit of _r, the billionth
hexadecimal digits of r 2, log(2) and 1og2(2), and the ten billionth decimal digit of
log(9/10). Details are given in Section 4. A previous result in this same spirit
is the Rabinowitz-Wagon "spigot" algorithm for lr. In that scheme, however, the
computation of the digit at position n depends on all digits preceding position n.
We are interested in computing in polynomially logarithmic space and polynomial
time. This class is usually denoted SC (space = log°O)(d) and time = d °(1) where
d is the place of the "digit" to be computed). Actually we are most interested in
the space we will denote by SC* of polynomially logarithmic space and (almost)
linear time (here we want the time = O(dlog°O)(d))). There is always a possible
ambiguity when computing a digit string base b in distinguishing a sequence of
digits a(b - l)(b - 1)(b - 1) from (a + 1)000. In this particular case we consider
either representation as an acceptable computation. In practice this problem does
not arise.
It is not known whether division is possible in SC, similarly it is not known whether
base change is possible in SC. The situation is even worse in SC*, where it is not
even known whether multiplication is possible. If two numbers are in SC* (in the
same base) then their product computes in time = O(d_log°(1)(d)) and is in SC
but not obviously in SC*. The d2 factor here is present because the logarithmic
space requirement precludes the usage of advanced multiplication techniques, such
as those based on FFTs.
We will not dwell on complexity issues except to point out that different algorithms
are needed for different bases (at least given our current ignorance about base
change) and very little closure exists on the class of numbers with d-th digit com-
putable in SC. Various of the complexity related issues are discussed in [6,8,9,11,14].
As we will show in Section 3, the class of numbers we can compute in SC* in base
b includes all numbers of the form
OO
(1.1) _ p(k)
k=l bCkq(k)'
where p and q are polynomials with integer coefficients and c is a positive integer.
Since addition is possible in SC', integer linear combinations of such numbers are
also feasible (provided the base is fixed).
Thealgorithmforthebinarydigitsof 7r,whichalsoshowsthat7ris in SC*in base
2,restsonthefollowingremarkableidentity:
Theorem 1. The following identity holds."
1 4 2 1 i(1.2) 7r= ]-_(_ + 1 Si+4 8i+5 8i+6 )"
i=0
This can also be written as:
_o P_
(1.3) 7r = E 16[_Ji'
i=1
[Pi] = [4,0,0,-2,-1,-1,0,0]
where the overbar notation indicates that the sequence is periodic.
Proof. This identity is equivalent to:
1/,/7 4v_ - 8x 3 - 4v/2x 4 - 8x 5(1.4) 7r = dx,
a0 1 - x s
which on substituting y := v/'2x becomes
1 16 y - 16= u _2 - 4v_4 dr
The equivalence of (1.2) and (1.4) is straightforward. It follows from the identity
fllVSxk_l__ fllv'___
.io 1 - x s dx = x k-l+si dx
dO i=0
1
-- v/_k i=0 16i(8i + k)
That the integral (1.4) evaluates to 7r is an exercise in partial fractions most easily
done in Maple or Mathematica. []
This proof entirely conceals the route to discovery. We found the identity (1.2) by
a combination of inspired guessing and extensive searching using the PSLQ integer
relation algorithm [3,12].
Shortly after the authors originally annour/ced the result (1.2), several colleagues,
including Helaman Ferguson, Tom Hales, Victor Adamchik, Stan Wagon, Donald
Knuth and Robert Harley, pointed out to us other formulas for 7r of this type. One
intriguing example is
1 2 2 1 1/2 1/2 1/__4.]7r= _7(_+ _+ 4i+3 4i+5 4i+6 4i+7"'
i=0
which can be written more compactly as
2 10 4' 4i+1+4-V +45 )
In [2], this and some related identities are derived using Mathematica.
As it turns out, these other formulas for 7r can all be written as formula (1.2) plus
a rational multiple of the identity
1 -8 8 4 8 20=
i=0
2 1
8i+6 8i+7 )
(2.3)
and
(2.4)
2. Identities.
As usual, we define the rn-th polylogarithm Lm by
zi(2.1) Lm(z) := .== Izl < 1.
i----1
The most basic identity is
(2.2)
which shows that log(1 - 2 -n) is in SC* base 2 for integer n. (See also section 5.)
Much less obvious are the identities
7r2 = 36L2(1/2) - 36L2(1/4) - 12L_(1/8) + 6L_(1/64)
1og2(2) = 4L2(1/2) - 6L_(I/4) - 2L2(1/8) + L_(1/64).
These can be written as
c_ ai
(2.5) _r2 = 36 E 2ii _'
i=l
[ai] : [1,-3,-2,-3, 1, O]
-log(1 - 2-") = L,(1/2")
The proof of this identity is similar to that of Theorem 1.
The identities of the next section and Section 5 show that, in base 2, 7r_, 1og2(2)
and various other constants, including {log(2), log(3),..., 1og(22)} are in SC*. (We
don't know however if 1og(23) is even in SC.)
We will describe the algorithm in the Section 3. Complexity issues are discussed
in [3,5,6,7,8,9,14,19,21] and algorithmic issues in [5,6,7,8,14]. The requisite special
function theory may be found in [1,5,15,16,17,20].
oo b,(26) 1og2(2)= 2Z 2,i2'
,=1
[bi] = [2,-10,-7,-10, 2,-1].
Here the overline notation indicates that the sequences repeat. Thus we see that
r 2 and log2(2) are in SC* in base 2. These two formulas can alternately be written
oo
  ((6i16 24 8= 8 + 1) 2 (6i + 2) 2 (6i+ 3) 2 6 1(6i + 4) 2 + (6i + 5) 2 )
1 _ 1 _ -16 16 40 14 10 1
1°g2(2) : 8 i=0 6-47_(6-_)2+(6i + 1)2 (6i + 2) 2 (6i + 3) 2 (6i + 4)------------_ + (6i + 5)-------------_)"
Identities (2.3)-(2-6) are examples of polylogarithmic ladders in the base 1/2 in
the sense of [16]. As with (1.2) we found them by searching for identities of this
type using an integer relation algorithm. We have not found them directly in print.
However (2.5) follows from equation (4.70) of [15] with (_ = r/3,/3 = 7r/2 and 7 =
7r/3. Identity (2.6) now follows from the well known identity
(2.7) 12L2(1/2) = _r2 - 6 log_(2).
A distinct but similar formula that we have found for 7r2 is
¢¢ 1 16 16 8 16 4
_r2=2..,_7_-_+1)2_-'' (8i+2) _ (8i+3) 2 (8i+4) 2 (8i+5) 2
i=0
(8i q- 6) 2
2 \
(8i + 7)2J'
which can be derived from the methods of section 1.
There are several ladder identities involving L3:
(2.8) 35/2_(3) - rr2 log(2) = 36L3(1/2) - 18L3(1/4) - 4L3(1/8) + L3(1/64),
(2.9) 21og3(2) - 7_(3) = -24L3(1/2) + 18L3(1/4) + 4L3(1/8) - L3(1/64),
(2.10) 10 log3(2)- 2rr 2 log(2) = -48L3(1/2)+54L3(1/4)+ 12L3(1/8)- 3L3(1/64).
The favored algorithms for 7r of the last centuries involved some variant of Machin's
1706 formula:
_r 1 1
(2.11) _ = 4 arctan g - arctan 23"---9
There are many related formula [15,16,17,20] but to be useful to us all the arguments
of the arctans have to be a power of a common base, and we have not discovered
any such formula for 7r . One can however write
r 1 1
(2.12) _ = 2 arctan _ + arctan
Thiscanbewrittenas
(2.13) v/2rr=4f(1/2)+f(1/8) where f(x):= 2i+1
i---1
and allows for the calculation of x/_r in SC*.
Another two identities involving Catalan's constant G, _r and log(2) are:
7r log(2) ¢i
(2.14) G -
8 i=1 2[ '_-_-Ji2 '
[ci] = [1, 1, 1,0,-1,-1,-1,0]
and
(2.15) 57r2 1og2(2) oo di
96 8 - E 2l'-_j i2'
i=1
[di] = [1,0,-1,-1,-1,0, 1, 1]
These may be found in [17 p. 105, p. 151]. Thus 8G- 7flog(2) is also in SC* in
base 2, but it is open and interesting as to whether G is itself in SC* in base 2.
A family of base 2 ladder identities exist:
Lm(1/64) Lm(1/8) 2 Lm(1/4) 4 Lm(1/2) 5 (-log(2)) m
(2.16) 6m_1 3m_1 2m-1 + 9 9m!
7r_ (- log(2)) m-_ 7r4 (- log(2)) m-4 403 ((5) (- log(2)) "'-S = 0.
54 (m - 2)! 486 (m - 4)! 1296 (m- 5)!
The above identity holds for 1 _< m _< 5; when the arguments to factorials are
negative they are taken to be infinite so the corresponding terms disappear. See
[16, p. 45].
As in the case of formula (1.2) for 7r, colleagues of the authors have subsequently
pointed out several other formulas of this type for various constants. Three exam-
ples reported by Knuth, which are based on formulas in [13, p. 17, 18, 22, 47, 139],
are
1 1 1/2 1/4
,Sin(1 + = Z (85- + + +
i=O
1/8 )
oo 1 1 1/2 1/4 1/8
x/2 arctan(1/v_) = _-_ _7 (_ + 1 8i+3+8i+5 8i+7 )
i=0
oo 1 1 1 1/2 1/_.4 )
arctan(1/3) : _-'_ _6-7 (_ + 1 8i+2 8i+4 8i+5"
i=0
Thus these constants are also in class SC*. Some other examples can be found in
[18].
3. The Algorithm.
Our algorithm to compute individual base-b digits of certain constants is based on
the binary scheme for exponentiation, wherein one evaluates x'* rapidly by succes-
sive squaring and multiplication. This reduces the number of multiplications to
less than 21og2(n ). According to Knuth [14], where details are given, this trick
goes back at least to 200 B.C. In our application, we need to perform exponentia-
tion modulo a positive integer c, but the overall scheme is the same -- one merely
performs all operations modulo c. An efficient formulation of this algorithm is as
follows.
To compute r = bn mod c, first set t to be the largest power of two < n, and set
r = 1. Then
A: if n > t then r _ br mod c; n _ n - t; endif
if t > 1 then r _-- r _ rood c; go to A; endif
Here and in what follows, "mod" is used in the binary operator sense, namely as the
binary function defined by x mod V := x - [x/V]y. Note that the above algorithm
is entirely performed with positive integers that do not exceed c _ in size. Thus it
can be correctly performed, without round-off error, provided a numeric precision
of at least 1 + 2 log 2 c bits is used.
Consider now a constant defined by a series of the form
OO
_=_--_ 1
k=0 bckp( k ) '
where b and c are positive integers and p(k) is a polynomial with integer coefficients.
First observe that the digits in the base b expansion of _beginning at position n + 1
can be obtained from the fractional part of bn_. Thus we can write
oo bn_ck
bn_ modl=_-- modl
z..,k=0p(k)
L_/cJ
mod p(k) oo bn_ek5-" mod 1 + _ -- mod 1p(k) -- p(k)
k=0 k=tnlcJ+l
(3.4)
For each term of the first summation, the binary exponentiation scheme is used
to evaluate the numerator. Then floating-point arithmetic is used to perform the
division and add the result to the sum mod 1. The second summation, where
the exponent of b is negative, may be evaluated as written using floating-point
arithmetic. It is only necessary to compute a few terms of this second summation,
just enough to insure that the remaining terms sum to less than the "epsilon" of
the floating-point arithmetic being used. The final result, a fraction between 0 and
1, is then converted to the desired base b.
Since floating-point arithmetic is used here in divisions and in addition modulo 1,
the result is of course subject to round-off error. If the floating-point arithmetic
system being used has the property that the result of each individual floating-point
operation is in error by at most one bit (as in systems implementing the IEEE
arithmetic standard), then no more than log2(2n ) bits of the final result will be
corrupted. This is actually a generous estimate, since it does not assume any
cancelation of errors, which would yield a lower estimate. In any event, it is clear
that ordinary IEEE 64-bit arithmetic is sufficient to obtain a numerically significant
result for even a large computation, and "quad precision" (i.e. 128-bit) arithmetic,
if available, can insure that the final result is accurate to several digits beyond
the one desired. One can check the significance of a computed result beginning
at position n by also performing a computation at position n + 1 or n - 1 and
comparing the trailing digits produced.
The most basic interesting constant whose digits can be computed using this scheme
is
timlog(2) = k2 k
k=l
in base 2. Using this scheme to compute hexademical digits of _r from identity (1.2)
is only marginally more complicated, since one can rewrite formula (1.2) using four
sums of the required form. Details are given in the next section. In both cases, in
order to compute the n-th binary digit (or a fixed number of binary digits at the
n-th place) we must sum O(n) terms of the series. Each term requires O(log(n))
arithmetic operations and the required precision is O(log(n)) digits. This gives
a total bit complexity of O(n log(n)m(log(n))) where M(j) is the complexity of
multiplying j bit integers. So even with ordinary multiplication the bit complexity
is O(n log3(n)).
This algorithm is, by a factor of log(log(log(n))), asymptotically slower than the
fastest known algorithms for generating the n-th digit by generating all of the first
n digits of log(2) or 7r [7]. The asymptotically fastest algorithms for all the first
n digits known requires a Strassen-Sch6nhage multiplication [19]; the algorithms
actually employed use an FFT based multiplication and are marginally slower than
our algorithm, from a complexity point of view, for computing just the n-th digit. Of
course this complexity analysis is totally misleading: the strength of our algorithm
rests mostly on its easy implementation in standard precision without requiring
FFT methods to accelerate the computation.
It is clear that the above methods can easily be extended to evaluate digits of
contstants defined by a formula of the form
where p and q are polynomials with integer coefficients and e is a positive integer.
Similarly if p and q are slowly growing analytic functions of various types the
method extends.
4. Computations.
We report here computations of 7r, log(2), logS(2), 7r_ and log(9/10), based on
the formulas (1.1), (2.2), (2.5), (2.6) and the identity log(0/10) = -LI(1/10),
respectively.
Each of our computations employed quad precision floating-point arithmetic for
division and sum mod 1 operations. Quad precision is supported from Fortran on
the IBM RS6000/590 and the SGI Power Challenge (R8000), which were employed
by the authors in these computations. We were able to avoid the usage of explicit
quad precision in the exponentiation scheme by exploiting a hardware feature com-
mon to these two systems, namely the 106-bit internal registers in the multiply-add
operation. This saved considerable time, because quad precision operations are
significantly more expensive than 64-bit operations.
Computation of 7r2 and !og2(2) presented a special challenge, because one must
perform the exponentiation algorithm modulo k s instead of k. When n is larger than
only 213, some terms of the series (2.5) and (2.6) must be computed with a modulus
k 2 that is greater than 226. Squares that appear in the exponentiation algorithm will
then exceed 2_2, which is the nearly the maximum precision of IEEE 64-bit floating-
point numbers. When n is larger than 226, then squares in the exponentiation
algorithm will exceed 2 TM, which is nearly the limit of quad precision.
This difficulty can be remedied using a method which has been employed for ex-
ample in searches for Wieferich primes [10]. Represent the running value r in the
exponentiation algorithm by the ordered pair (rl,r2), where r = ra + kr2, and
where rl and r2 are positive integers less than k. Then one can write
7"2 = ('1 "-{- _7"2) 2 = r2 ._ 21r.lr2_ "3L r2ks
When this is.reduced mod k s, the last term disappears. The remaining expression is
of the required ordered pair form, provided that r_ is first reduced mod k, the carry
from this reduction is added to 2firs, and this sum is also reduced mod k. Note
that this scheme can be implemented with integers of size not exceeding 2k 2. Since
the computation of r s mod k s is the key operation of the binary exponentiation
algorithm, this means that ordinary IEEE 64-bit floating-point arithmetic can be
used to compute the n-th hexadecimal digit of r 2 or 1og2(2) for n up to about
224. For larger n, we still used this basic scheme, but we employed the multiply-
add "trick" mentioned above to avoid the need for explicit quad precision in this
section of code.
Our results are given below. The first entry, for example, gives the 106-th through
106+ 13-th hexadecimal digits of 7rafter the "decimal" point. In all cases we did the
calculations twice -- the second calculation was similar to the first, except shifted
back one position. Since this changes all the arithmetic performed, it is a highly
rigorous validity check. Thus we believe that all the digits shown below are correct.
Constant: Base: Position: Digits from Position:
7r 16 106 26C65E52CB4593
107 17hF5863EFED8D
10 s ECB840E21926EC
10 9 85895585AO428B
10 t° 921C73C6838FB2
log(2) 16 10 6 418489h9406EC9
10 7 815F479E2B9102
10 8 E648F40940E13E
10 9 BIEEF1252297EC
z2 16 10 6 685554E1228505
10 7 9862837hD8AABF
10 8 4861AAF8F861BE
109 437A2BA4A13591
log2(2) 16 10 6 2ECTEDB82B2DF7
10 7 33374B47882832
10 8 3F55150FIAB3DC
10 9 8BA7C885CEFCE8
log(9/lO) 10 106 80174212190900
107 21093001236414
10 s 01309302330968
10 9 44066397959215
101° 82528693381274
These computations were done at NASA Ames Research Center, using workstation
cycles that otherwise would have been idle.
5. Logs in base 2.
It is easy to compute, in base 2, the d-th binary digit of
(5.1) log(1 - 2 -n) = L1(1/2").
So it is easy to compute log(m) for any integer m that can be written as
(2"' - 1)(2 _= - 1)...(2 "h - 1)(5.2) m :=
(2 b, - 1)(2 b_ - 1)...(2 b, - 1)"
In particular the n-th cyclotomic polynomial evaluated at 2 is so computable. A
check shows that all primes less than 19 are of this form. The beginning of this list
is:
{2,3,5,7, 11,13, 17,31,43,57,73,127, 151,205,257} .
10
Since
2 is-1 =7.9.19.73,
and since 7, x/9 and 73 are all on the above list we can compute log(19) in SC*
from
log(19) --- log(218 - 1) - log(7) -log(9) - 1og(73).
Note that 21_ - 1 = 23- 89 so either both 1og(23) and 1og(89) are in SC* or neither
is.
We would like to thank Carl Pomerance for showing that an identity of type (5.2)
does not exist for 23. This is a consequence of the fact that each cyclotomic poly-
nomial evaluated at two has a new distinct prime factor. We would also like to
thank Robert Harley for pointing out that 29 and 37 are in _cC* in base 2 via
consideration of the Aurefeuillian factors 2 2n-1 -4-2 '_ + 1 and 2 2n-1 -- 2n + 1.
6. Relation Bounds.
One of the first questions that arises in the wake of the above study is whether there
exists a scheme of this type to compute decimal digits of It. At present we know
of no identity like (1.2) in base 10. The chances that there is such an identity are
dimmed by some numerical results that we have obtained using the PSLQ integer
relation algorithm [3, 12]. These computations establish (with the usual provisos
of computer "proofs") that there are no identities (except for the case n = 16) of
the form
[ 1al _ 1 a2 a3 am+l .7r= -- + -_ mfe _ l ÷ mk + 2 ÷ . . . + mk + m j ,
ao _:
where n ranges from 2 to 128, where m ranges from 1 to min(n, 32), and where
the Euclidean norm of the integer vector (a0, al,... ,a,_+l) is 1012 or less. These
results of course do not have any bearing on the possibility that there is a formula
not of this form which permits computation of 7r in some non-binary base.
In fact, J. P. Buhler has reported a proof that any identity for r of the above form
must have n = 2K or n = v_ K. This also does not exclude more complicated
formulae for the computation of 7r base 10.
7. Questions.
As mentioned in the previous section, we cannot at present compute decimal digits
of _r by our methods because we know of no identity like (1.2) in base 10. But it
seems unlikely that it is fundamentally impossible to do so. This raises the following
obvious problem:
1] Find an algorithm for the n-th decimal digit of 7r in SC*. It is not even clear
that r is in SC in base 10 but it ought to be possible to show this.
2] Show that 7r is in SC in all bases.
3] Are e and x/_ in SC (SC*) in any base?
11
Similarly the treatment of log is incomplete:
4] Is log(2) in SC* in base 10?
5] Is 1og(23) in SC* in base 2?
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